Baltic Pipe – what is it and why is this gas pipeline so important?
Baltic Pipe is one of the most important infrastructure projects in the Baltic Sea region and Eastern Europe, which has permanently changed the way of thinking about energy security in some countries, such as Poland and parts of Central and Eastern Europe. It is a gas pipeline system enabling the transmission of natural gas from Norway, through Denmark, to Poland - and in the future also to other countries such as Slovakia or Lithuania. In practice, this means creating a real alternative to supplies of raw material from the eastern direction, primarily from Russia.
The importance of Baltic Pipe, however, goes far beyond Eastern Europe alone. It is an investment that fits into the broader European process of diversification of energy sources, restructuring of the gas market, and strengthening the resilience of European Union countries to political pressure from external suppliers. In this sense, Baltic Pipe is not only an energy project, but also a geopolitical one.
Baltic Pipe, however, is above all a change in thinking. It diversifies the approach to the energy issue and is a response to the stagnation Europe has fallen into under the influence of Berlin’s policy, in the context of thinking without alternatives to energy resources from Russia. While Germany invested enormous resources in Nord Stream 2, contributing to the complete dependence of its economy on a single Russian, not very predictable direction, further reinforced by irrational decisions such as closing its own nuclear power plants - Eastern Europe, led by Warsaw, showed what rational diversification is. At a time when European money was building the capital strength of the Russian state, unfortunately later used for war purposes - Poland focused on LNG terminals opening its economy to obtaining gas from Qatar and the USA - and reached an agreement with Norway, gaining gas from a predictable and non-threatening direction. Baltic Pipe is not just a gas project, it is a strategy.
For decades, the Polish gas system was an example of classic infrastructure dependence, related to the country’s dependence on the Soviet Union in the previous era - before 1989. The dominant supply direction meant not only limited flexibility, but also strategic risk. In such a configuration, even commercial issues – such as prices or contract terms – were in practice embedded in a political context - and imposed. Poland was forced by the Russian Gazprom to accept much higher fees for supplied gas than, for example, the Netherlands or Germany, which resulted from the lack of the possibility to replace it with something else. Such possibilities did not in fact exist - there was a lack of infrastructure to receive gas from other countries.
Baltic Pipe changes this logic. It does not eliminate risks completely, but disperses them and shifts the weight of the system from a single direction to a multi-vector model. Norway does not appear to be a country with the potential to use trade or economic influence to impose political dominance in the region. Poland gains the ability to build a supply portfolio instead of reacting to conditions imposed by a single partner.
The idea of building the Baltic Pipe pipeline dates back shortly after 2000, although the concepts probably existed in the minds of some decision-makers already in the 1990s. The first concepts of connecting Poland with Norwegian gas fields appeared in the public space already in 2001–2003, and talks with the Norwegians also began shortly afterwards - however, the project was then suspended for economic reasons. The idea was revived after 2015, in the context of increasing energy security and becoming independent from supplies from Moscow.
In 2016, a memorandum was signed between the operators Gaz-System and Energinet, which initiated real preparatory work and technical analyses, and in the following years the project went through the planning, permitting, and financing phases, ultimately leading to the start of construction in 2020 and commissioning in 2022.
Baltic Pipe map - as can be seen, the construction of the investment required an agreement also with Denmark,
through whose territory the pipeline runs.
This is a fundamental qualitative change for Eastern Europe. In energy, the difference between “access to gas” and “control over the supply structure” is crucial. Baltic Pipe shifts Poland towards the latter model, and Poland has become, in a way, a provider of energy security for its neighbors instead of a country dependent on Russia. The expansion of the gas transmission system in Eastern European countries is ongoing, and it can be assumed that the system is still being created. Poland may and will probably play the role of a gas hub in it, although the system is currently at an early stage of development. For example, at the beginning of 2026 Poland proposed gas supplies to Slovakia 🇸🇰.
At the same time, Poland, but also for example Lithuania, were simultaneously investing in LNG terminals. Their possession also enabled more effective price negotiations with suppliers, because they knew that these countries had an alternative in the form of supplies from Qatar, Arab countries or the USA. As a result, they were more willing to offer better supply prices.
At a time when relatively weaker economies of Eastern Europe successfully attempted to break dependence on Russia - Germany, more or less consciously, tightened its cooperation with Russia, in practice leading to complete dependence on a single supplier. The effects of this policy turned out in practice to be the opposite of what Eastern Europe was pursuing at that time.
At that time, Angela Merkel’s government in Germany pursued a completely different policy, using cheap Russian gas supplied, for example, via Nord Stream 1, running from Russia along the bottom of the Baltic Sea to Germany. It was supposed to be strengthened by Nord Stream 2 - an additional, more efficient pipeline. Germany assumed, and today it is beyond dispute that it was naive thinking - that Russia would want to be a good partner on whom Berlin could rely. After all, gas sales to Germany were an important budget item for Russia. It is astonishing that Germany pushed this policy for so many years without creating any safeguards in the form of diversification, without building LNG terminals or new connections with Norway and the North Sea. Even France, which is largely based on nuclear energy - for its own security has as many as 6 LNG terminals, although in reality it does so only for diversification - which it understands not in economic terms, but in terms of security.
After all, there were voices of criticism, not only coming from Warsaw or Bucharest, but also from within Germany. Germany put everything on one card, going further - nurturing vain hopes that it would be able to become a gas hub and resell Russian gas at a profit also to other countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic or France). To such an extent was trust placed in Russia and the reliability of its supplies - that it was considered possible to shut down its own nuclear power plants, which generated a significant percentage of energy in Germany. After their shutdown in 2023, the level of energy produced in Germany was still lower than in 1992 (data from the Fraunhofer Institute). This is nothing other than an economic disaster, only partly attributable to external factors, since almost all countries neighboring Germany protected themselves against it, often having much weaker financial and political capabilities.
Russia saw it differently. Seeing Berlin’s dependence and the inability of German elites to change direction - it began to implement a policy of rebuilding its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, mainly in the area of the former Eastern Bloc. Moscow realized that the most important player in the EU - Berlin - had no ability to protest, because it fully relied on supplies from Russia, without which German industry would quickly collapse, and energy prices would skyrocket (which eventually happened in 2024–2026). The culmination of this policy was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Many experts believe that the economic base of the Russian army attacking Ukraine was in fact the European payments for energy resources transferred over the years.
Central and Eastern Europe for years functioned as a peripheral energy recipient, connected to a transmission system designed in the realities of the Cold War. Such an arrangement was not accidental – it reflected both geography and politics.
Baltic Pipe is one of the elements reversing this structure. Together with the expansion of interconnectors and LNG terminals, it creates a new map of energy flows, in which the region ceases to be the end of the supply chain and begins to be its active participant.
This has a geopolitical dimension. Countries that have alternative sources and supply routes not only increase their security, but also limit the ability of external actors to exert pressure. Baltic Pipe therefore fits into the process of “energy emancipation” of the region - as a response to the process of Germany’s deliberate dependence on Russian hydrocarbons. The idea was conceived in Warsaw, as the largest player in this part of Europe, but also one geographically capable of reaching an agreement with Norway. It would have been more difficult for countries such as the Czech Republic or Slovakia, located deep inland without access to the sea, but ultimately these countries also supported this direction.
Also deserving praise for forward-thinking is 🇱🇹 Lithuania, according to many experts a country once almost condemned to Russian fossil fuels - which thanks to investment in infrastructure completely reversed the trend. Moreover, in terms of energy policy - Vilnius and Warsaw speak with one voice and act in a constant alliance, regardless of changing governments.
Who was right in this dispute over strategy was shown by the situation after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. A huge crisis began in Germany, which has not really been overcome to this day. In 2026 it seems that it is only at its full peak and it is not really known when an improvement can be expected. Its cause is largely energy prices, which indirectly hit the automotive industry, the locomotive of the German economy. Of course, the matter is more complex.
Meanwhile, the countries of Eastern Europe - despite obvious difficulties at that time - basically returned to normal functioning of the gas market. Eastern Europe, by focusing on projects such as Baltic Pipe, avoided dependence not only on Russia, but also on Germany in the field of gas - refusing to be a recipient of gas transmitted to Germany via Nord Stream 2 (which, incidentally, ultimately collapsed due to the war in Ukraine).
Diversification - whether one likes it or not - has therefore become one of the key concepts of European energy policy. However, it is not only about the number of suppliers, but about the entire architecture of the system – physical connections, storage facilities, transmission capacities and market mechanisms. After all, suppliers such as Qatar are also not always 100% available, as shown by the situation after the attack by Israel and the USA on Iran at the turn of February and March 2026.
Baltic Pipe plays the role of the northern supply corridor in this system. It strengthens the integration of the European market, increases competition and enables more flexible management of gas flows. It makes other countries also have to adapt to the trend, because Eastern Europe is becoming more competitive - and energy prices are of key importance in the economic competition of countries, also within the EU. In crisis situations, such infrastructure can determine the ability of states to maintain the stability of the energy system.
From the perspective of Europe as a whole, this means a transition from a model of dependence to a model of redundancy – that is, a system in which the lack of one source does not cause the collapse of the whole. Baltic Pipe is only one of the elements, just like French LNG terminals or nuclear power plants.
Energy has for years been one of Russia’s main tools of influence in Europe. The model based on long-term contracts and dominant transmission directions created a structure in which energy dependence translated into political dependence.
Baltic Pipe is not an “anti-Russian” project in a declarative sense, but its consequences have such a character - at least in a political context. Every new supply route that bypasses the Russian transmission system reduces its importance and limits its ability to exert influence. This creates conditions in which Russia ceases to be a significant player in Europe, and at the moment its fossil fuels were the main lever of pressure on the European Union. Even if Europe returns to Russian gas someday (it cannot be ruled out that after the war in Ukraine this may happen), Russia will not have such a position and will not dictate prices.
In the long term, this leads to the erosion of the model in which energy was a geopolitical instrument. For Eastern Europe, this is a fundamental change – it means a transition from a reactive situation to a more autonomous one. It is putting the dot over the "i" - in 1989 with the fall of communism these countries regained independence, but only today are they working towards full independence in energy matters.
The European Union has for years declared the construction of a common energy market, but its real integration requires physical connections. Baltic Pipe is one of the elements of this puzzle.
Thanks to it, gas can be transported not only to Poland, but – through the system of regional connections – influence the situation in other countries. This strengthens the mechanisms of energy solidarity and increases the resilience of the entire system.
In practice, this means that local crises can be mitigated by cross-border flows. Baltic Pipe therefore does not operate in isolation – it is part of a larger system that gradually transforms the European gas market into a more integrated and resilient one. This means greater security for all of Europe, and certainly for its northern and eastern parts.
Europe’s energy transition is moving towards reducing the role of fossil fuels. In this context, the question arises about the sense of investing in gas infrastructure. The answer is not unequivocal, because Europe is slowly moving away from the policy of “green frenzy”, that is, excessively and dogmatically understood ecology, which is pushed forward without logic and without paying attention to causing even greater damage to societies and economies (see the German experiment of shutting down fully functional nuclear power plants - only to soon, due to a lack of electricity, have to import electricity generated from French ... nuclear power plants).
Natural gas remains, for now, formally a transitional fuel that stabilizes the energy system during the development of renewable energy sources. However, what is crucial is where it comes from and in what system it is delivered. It is not excluded that gas will remain an important fuel in the European energy mix. A decisive moment is underway and it seems that the agony of German industry and the failure of building an economy based only on renewables may ultimately indicate the need to abandon pro-ecological illusions. Such voices can already be heard in every country in Europe, although no one denies ecology.
Baltic Pipe fits into the logic of a “safe transition”, but it may turn out to remain an important structure for decades – it allows the use of gas while simultaneously reducing geopolitical risks. In this sense, the project is compatible with the transition, although its importance will evolve along with the development of new technologies.
Baltic Pipe strengthens Poland’s position as a country actively shaping the energy policy of the region. From a country dependent on one supply direction, Poland is becoming an important infrastructure hub.
This translates into greater negotiating power, both in bilateral relations and at the EU level. A country that has alternative sources and infrastructure has a greater ability to conduct an independent policy.
For Eastern Europe, this is also a signal that it is possible to build its own architecture of energy security, and not only adapt to existing arrangements.
Although Baltic Pipe has great strategic importance, it is not a solution to all problems. Energy security requires an entire ecosystem: storage facilities, interconnectors, LNG terminals and investments in new energy sources.
In the future, the role of gas may decrease, but infrastructure such as Baltic Pipe may be adapted to new applications – e.g. the transport of decarbonized gases. This shows that its importance does not have to be limited to the current energy model.
Baltic Pipe is a project best understood not through the prism of kilometers of pipes or capacity, but as an element of systemic change. It is infrastructure that redefines dependencies, strengthens resilience and changes the balance of power in Europe.
For Poland, it means greater energy sovereignty. For Eastern Europe – reducing historical dependencies and strengthening aspirations that the region has in abundance, especially in terms of independence. For the entire European Union – a step towards a more integrated and secure energy market.
In a world where energy remains one of the key political resources, Baltic Pipe is an example of how technical infrastructure can become a tool of geopolitics and building position.
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